Due Diligence Doesn't Prevent Bad Deals (Here's What Does)
80% of advisory fees are contingent on deal completion. The people paid to find problems are paid more when they don't.
80%
of M&A advisory fees are contingent on deal completion.
McLaughlin, Journal of Financial Economics (1990)
The Paradox
A 2024 analysis of 40,000 acquisitions over 40 years found that 70-75% fail to achieve their stated objectives. This aligns with decades of prior research: Clayton Christensen at Harvard Business School, Roger Martin at Rotman, and multiple Bain studies have all landed on similar figures.
Every one of those deals had due diligence. Often extensive due diligence, from reputable providers, at significant cost.
The DD didn't stop them.
According to Bain's 2020 Global M&A Report, 60% of executives attributed deal failure to poor due diligence that did not identify critical issues. This isn't because DD providers are incompetent. It's because the system isn't structured to produce "no" as an outcome.
M&A Advisory Fee Structure
The advisor's fee increases when the deal closes, not when problems are found.
The Structural Reality
The fee structure. Research by Robyn McLaughlin in the Journal of Financial Economics found that 80% of M&A advisory fees are contingent on deal completion. Only 6% of bidding firms use fixed fees. This isn't hidden: it's industry standard.
The market share dynamic. P. Raghavendra Rau's research found that bank market share is positively related to contingent fee payments and deal completion rates. Critically, there was no relationship found between contingent fees and post-acquisition performance. Advisors who close deals get more business. Advisors who kill deals do not.
The valuation bias. A 2013 study by Cain and Denis in the Journal of Law and Economics found that acquirer advisors exhibit positive valuation errors significantly greater than target advisors. The people advising buyers systematically overvalue targets.
When DD Was Done But Deals Still Failed
HP-Autonomy
HP's financial DD reportedly consisted of "four conference calls lasting approximately one and a half hours each."
JPMorgan-Frank
Founder hired a data scientist for $18,000 to create synthetic user data presented during DD. Convicted March 2025.
Caterpillar-Siwei
Both Deloitte and Ernst & Young conducted DD. Receivables had grown 58% annually since 2008 and exceeded total sales by 2011. Neither flagged it.
FTX Investor Losses
Temasek claimed 8 months of DD. Later admitted their "belief in the judgment, leadership, and actions of Sam Bankman-Fried was misplaced."
Ask yourself: when was the last time your DD provider told you not to do a deal?
What the Research Shows
Kisgen, Qian, and Song's 2009 study in the Journal of Financial Economics examined fairness opinions: third-party assessments meant to validate deal terms. They found that acquirer announcement returns are 2.3% lower when acquirers have fairness opinions. Investors are skeptical of transactions with fairness opinions, especially at high premiums.
The market has learned to price in the conflict. When an advisor says a deal is fair, investors discount it.
The Counterpoint
Steve Kaplan at Chicago Booth notes that combined returns at deal announcement are usually positive. And Golubov et al.'s 2012 research in the Journal of Finance found that top-tier advisors do deliver higher bidder returns in public acquisitions, translating to $65.83 million in shareholder gains for average bidders. The system isn't uniformly broken. But the incentives don't automatically align with the buyer's interests.
What Tends to Make a Difference
The deals that get stopped usually have one thing in common: someone asked the uncomfortable question early. Not at the end of a 200-page report, but before the process gained momentum.
Some firms define upfront what would make them walk away. Others separate the people gathering information from the people making the call. The common thread isn't a specific methodology. It's creating space for "no" to be a legitimate outcome.
The question isn't whether your DD provider is good at their job. It's whether the process you've built together allows for an answer you don't want to hear.
DD is a valuable tool. It surfaces information that wouldn't otherwise be visible. But information alone doesn't prevent bad decisions.
What prevents bad decisions is a process that can tolerate bad news.
Sources
| Claim | Source | Year |
|---|---|---|
| 80% of advisory fees contingent on deal completion | McLaughlin, Journal of Financial Economics | 1990 |
| 70-75% of acquisitions fail (40,000 deals analyzed) | Lev & Gu, Fortune/NYU Stern | 2024 |
| 60% attribute deal failure to poor DD | Bain & Company, Global M&A Report | 2020 |
| No relationship between contingent fees and post-acquisition performance | Rau, Journal of Financial Economics | 2000 |
| Acquirer advisors show larger positive valuation errors | Cain & Denis, Journal of Law and Economics | 2013 |
| 2.3% lower returns when acquirers have fairness opinions | Kisgen, Qian & Song, Journal of Financial Economics | 2009 |
| Top-tier advisors deliver $65.83M higher returns in public deals | Golubov et al., The Journal of Finance | 2012 |
| HP-Autonomy: $11.1B deal, $8.8B writedown | CIO Magazine, UK Court Records | 2011-2024 |
| JPMorgan-Frank: $175M, fake customer data | ACFE, Federal Court Records | 2021-2025 |
| Caterpillar-Siwei: $886M deal, $580M writedown | Mining.com, Caterpillar SEC Filings | 2012 |
| FTX: $8B+ missing despite institutional DD | Cointelegraph, Temasek Statement | 2022 |