Red Label
Red Label
Counterpoint

Due Diligence Doesn't Prevent Bad Deals (Here's What Does)

80% of advisory fees are contingent on deal completion. The people paid to find problems are paid more when they don't.

Red Label Intelligence

80%

of M&A advisory fees are contingent on deal completion.

McLaughlin, Journal of Financial Economics (1990)

The Paradox

A 2024 analysis of 40,000 acquisitions over 40 years found that 70-75% fail to achieve their stated objectives. This aligns with decades of prior research: Clayton Christensen at Harvard Business School, Roger Martin at Rotman, and multiple Bain studies have all landed on similar figures.

Every one of those deals had due diligence. Often extensive due diligence, from reputable providers, at significant cost.

The DD didn't stop them.

According to Bain's 2020 Global M&A Report, 60% of executives attributed deal failure to poor due diligence that did not identify critical issues. This isn't because DD providers are incompetent. It's because the system isn't structured to produce "no" as an outcome.

M&A Advisory Fee Structure

80% 20% Contingent on Deal Completion Fixed SOURCE: MCLAUGHLIN, JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS (1990)

The advisor's fee increases when the deal closes, not when problems are found.

The Structural Reality

The fee structure. Research by Robyn McLaughlin in the Journal of Financial Economics found that 80% of M&A advisory fees are contingent on deal completion. Only 6% of bidding firms use fixed fees. This isn't hidden: it's industry standard.

The market share dynamic. P. Raghavendra Rau's research found that bank market share is positively related to contingent fee payments and deal completion rates. Critically, there was no relationship found between contingent fees and post-acquisition performance. Advisors who close deals get more business. Advisors who kill deals do not.

The valuation bias. A 2013 study by Cain and Denis in the Journal of Law and Economics found that acquirer advisors exhibit positive valuation errors significantly greater than target advisors. The people advising buyers systematically overvalue targets.

When DD Was Done But Deals Still Failed

2011

HP-Autonomy

Deal Value $11.1B
Writedown $8.8B

HP's financial DD reportedly consisted of "four conference calls lasting approximately one and a half hours each."

2021

JPMorgan-Frank

Deal Value $175M
Claimed Customers 4 million
Actual Customers <300,000

Founder hired a data scientist for $18,000 to create synthetic user data presented during DD. Convicted March 2025.

2012

Caterpillar-Siwei

Deal Value $886M
Writedown $580M

Both Deloitte and Ernst & Young conducted DD. Receivables had grown 58% annually since 2008 and exceeded total sales by 2011. Neither flagged it.

2022

FTX Investor Losses

Missing Funds $8B+
Sequoia Loss $214M

Temasek claimed 8 months of DD. Later admitted their "belief in the judgment, leadership, and actions of Sam Bankman-Fried was misplaced."

Ask yourself: when was the last time your DD provider told you not to do a deal?

What the Research Shows

Kisgen, Qian, and Song's 2009 study in the Journal of Financial Economics examined fairness opinions: third-party assessments meant to validate deal terms. They found that acquirer announcement returns are 2.3% lower when acquirers have fairness opinions. Investors are skeptical of transactions with fairness opinions, especially at high premiums.

The market has learned to price in the conflict. When an advisor says a deal is fair, investors discount it.

The Counterpoint

Steve Kaplan at Chicago Booth notes that combined returns at deal announcement are usually positive. And Golubov et al.'s 2012 research in the Journal of Finance found that top-tier advisors do deliver higher bidder returns in public acquisitions, translating to $65.83 million in shareholder gains for average bidders. The system isn't uniformly broken. But the incentives don't automatically align with the buyer's interests.

What Tends to Make a Difference

The deals that get stopped usually have one thing in common: someone asked the uncomfortable question early. Not at the end of a 200-page report, but before the process gained momentum.

Some firms define upfront what would make them walk away. Others separate the people gathering information from the people making the call. The common thread isn't a specific methodology. It's creating space for "no" to be a legitimate outcome.

The question isn't whether your DD provider is good at their job. It's whether the process you've built together allows for an answer you don't want to hear.

DD is a valuable tool. It surfaces information that wouldn't otherwise be visible. But information alone doesn't prevent bad decisions.

What prevents bad decisions is a process that can tolerate bad news.

Sources

Claim Source Year
80% of advisory fees contingent on deal completion McLaughlin, Journal of Financial Economics 1990
70-75% of acquisitions fail (40,000 deals analyzed) Lev & Gu, Fortune/NYU Stern 2024
60% attribute deal failure to poor DD Bain & Company, Global M&A Report 2020
No relationship between contingent fees and post-acquisition performance Rau, Journal of Financial Economics 2000
Acquirer advisors show larger positive valuation errors Cain & Denis, Journal of Law and Economics 2013
2.3% lower returns when acquirers have fairness opinions Kisgen, Qian & Song, Journal of Financial Economics 2009
Top-tier advisors deliver $65.83M higher returns in public deals Golubov et al., The Journal of Finance 2012
HP-Autonomy: $11.1B deal, $8.8B writedown CIO Magazine, UK Court Records 2011-2024
JPMorgan-Frank: $175M, fake customer data ACFE, Federal Court Records 2021-2025
Caterpillar-Siwei: $886M deal, $580M writedown Mining.com, Caterpillar SEC Filings 2012
FTX: $8B+ missing despite institutional DD Cointelegraph, Temasek Statement 2022